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Abstract 
Even though male participation in feminism is essential to its success, it is possible that men are 
reluctant to get involved in the movement because of its primary association with women 
(Holmgren & Hearn, 2009). This research investigated whether certain moral concerns 
contribute to men endorsing feminism. According to the Moral Foundations Theory there are 
five moral concerns: harm (i.e., the concern for someone’s physical and emotional well-being), 
fairness (i.e., the concern for equality and justice), ingroup (i.e., the concern for loyalty to group 
membership), authority (i.e., the concern for tradition and the social hierarchy), and purity (i.e., 
the concern for physical and spiritual cleanliness; Graham et al.,2011). Graham and colleagues 
(2009) found that harm and fairness correlate to liberalism; therefore we predicted that men’s 
feminism would be associated with an increased emphasis on those moral concerns and a 
decreased emphasis on ingroup, authority, and purity. Using an online survey methodology, 
participants were assessed on various aspects of feminism and morality. The results generally 
supported our predictions that higher support for conservative moral concerns correlates to less 
endorsement of feminism, whereas higher support for liberal moral concerns correlates to more 
endorsement of feminism, even when controlling for political ideology. This research contributes 
to our understanding of male resistance to and support of the feminist movement. 
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Dude Looks Like a Feminist!: Moral Concerns and Feminism Among Men 
Women’s rights movements have persisted well over the last century; however, feminism 
is still frequently misunderstood today. Although there are variations in its definition, feminism 
is commonly recognized as a movement driven to grant social, political, and economic equality 
to both women and men (Jackson, Fleury & Lewandowski, 1996). Supporting feminism can 
manifest in numerous ways, including endorsing feminist beliefs, identifying oneself as a 
feminist, and participating in feminist collective action (e.g., attending a feminist rally; Jackson 
et al., 1996; Nelson, Liss, Erchull, Hurt, Ramsey, Turner & Haines, 2008). Previous research 
indicates that women tend to endorse feminist beliefs the most, followed by smaller numbers of 
them choosing to self-label; in turn, feminist identification predicts feminist collective action 
(Burn, Aboud & Molves 2000; Nelson et al., 2008; Liss, Crawford & Popp, 2004; Zucker & 
Bay-Cheng, 2010). This trend highlights the subtle disconnect between beliefs, identification, 
and action, which could be influenced by pervasive negative stereotypes of feminists (Ramsey et 
al., 2007; Robnett, Anderson, & Hunter, 2012). Therefore, it is imperative to look past stigma 
and recognize shared beliefs of the feminist movement, before considering self-labeling and/or 
participating in collective action in support of the ideology. 
Unfortunately, stigma and stereotypes surrounding feminism and its members are so 
persistent that they continue to discourage association with the word itself (Anastosopoulos & 
Desmarais, 2015; Robnett et al., 2012). For example, feminists have been characterized as ugly, 
man-hating lesbians in search of reverse discrimination (Edley & Wetherell, 2001). These 
adverse stereotypes reflect poorly on women and challenge their competence. Feminists 
experience societal backlash, such as women being painted adversely and utilized as 
justifications for catalyzing a defense of the existing gender hierarchy (Yeung, Kay & Peach, 
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2014). Due to the negative connotation that still lingers with feminism, research shows that 
people respond more positively to the effort being called a women’s movement (Buschman & 
Lenart, 1996). However, the term “women’s movement” seems to ignore the work that feminists 
do to improve the lives of men, and therefore may discourage men from identifying with and 
supporting the movement.  
Men must overcome additional hurdles beyond negative stereotypes, in order to self-label 
and act in support of feminism, due to the fact that feminism tends to be perceived as focusing 
only on women (Rudman, Mescher & Moss-Rauscin, 2012). This gender role conflict poses a 
significant obstacle for men, deeply rooted in a fear of femininity, which perpetuates the 
preference for masculinity in Western societies and defines gender-appropriate behaviors 
accordingly (O’Neil, Helms, Gable, David & Wrightsman, 1986). One way in which men can 
avoid an association with femininity, and women in general, is to purposefully exclude 
themselves from or elect to ignore the feminist movement (Holmgren et al., 2009). To support 
feminism, men must align themselves with women, a lower-status group, and risk losing the 
privileges that come along with being an advantaged group member in today’s patriarchal 
society, for no apparent benefits (Rudman et al., 2012). As a result of associating with females, 
men face the threat of being labeled as effeminate and experiencing vilification, humiliation, and 
physical attacks (Wiley, Srinivasan, Finke, Firnhaber & Shilinsky, 2013). This demotion in 
social status aligns men with a lower status group, women (Fiske, Xu, Cuddy & Glick, 1999), as 
well as gay men, due to the perception that possessing any qualities deemed feminine makes 
someone gay (Rudman et al., 2012).  
In light of these obstacles, the most recent wave of activists has acknowledged the male 
role in the feminist movement (Pleasants, 2011). Researchers agree that men endorsing the effort 
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are extremely valuable to the cause (Holmgren et al., 2009). Males can be effective agents of 
change because their confrontations of sexism are “taken more seriously” than those of females 
(Drury & Kaiser, 2014, p. 645). Men, in particular, are more likely to listen to other male 
protests to sexism because eliminating all forms of sexism is predominantly understood as 
benefiting women and thus female advocation can be interpreted as self-serving (Drury & 
Kaiser, 2014). At the risk of undermining the value of female voices and affording male voices 
as the loudest and most respected authority on feminism, men could work alongside women to 
aid the platform for gender equality by reaching a different audience.  
Furthermore, contrary to the common sentiment that feminism only focuses on advancing 
women in society, the movement benefits men as well (Henley et al., 1998; Ramsey et al., 2007). 
After all, both women and men are impacted by gender bias throughout their lifespans (Henley et 
al., 2009). For example, sexist remarks that reinforce female dependence and passivity carry the 
strong implication that males must always be independent and aggressive. Hyper-masculinity 
boxes men in as sex-driven and domineering figures in society (Messner & Montez de Oca, 
2005). This prominent social model for men subjects them to norms contingent upon the 
adoption of voyeuristic behaviors and learning to reject or dread the notion of being in a 
committed and emotionally honest relationship (Blazina & Watkins, 2000; Messner & Montez 
de Oca, 2005). By encouraging freedom of expression and gender fluidity for women, men can 
expect the same treatment in return as societal equals.   
However, men who are unfamiliar with feminism may be oblivious to the potential 
benefits that the ideology could bring to their lives. In order for men to develop an interest in 
feminism, they must overcome the aforementioned obstacles of stigma and loss of status. What 
could motivate men to look beyond the negative stereotypes surrounding feminism and endorse 
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it? Perhaps male participation in feminism is contingent upon a sense of morality, or the desire to 
“do the right thing.” 
The Moral Foundations Theory can provide a solid base to answer that question as it 
outlines the five moral concerns of harm, fairness, ingroup, authority, and purity (Graham et al., 
2011). Harm is defined as a concern for someone’s physical and emotional well-being. Fairness 
is defined as a concern for equality and justice. Ingroup is defined as a concern for loyalty to a 
group to which one is a member. Authority is defined as a concern for tradition and the social 
hierarchy. The fifth moral concern of purity is defined as a concern for physical and spiritual 
cleanliness.  
Previous research has indicated that those five moral concerns correlate with political 
ideology (Graham, Haidt & Nosek, 2009). Ingroup, authority, and purity, referred to as binding 
traits, correlate to conservatism (Smith, Aquino, Koleva & Graham, 2014). These traits involve 
the desire to benefit one’s group to increase its longevity. Those who identify with conservative 
beliefs often seek to achieve the goal of group longevity by remaining united, or bound to each 
other, to ensure stability (Graham et al., 2009; Haidt & Graham, 2007). The harm and fairness 
concerns of morality, referred to as individualizing traits, correlate to liberalism. Those traits 
encompass a drive to protect individual rights and freedoms (Graham et al., 2011). Those who 
identify with liberal beliefs often strive to accomplish the objective of defending personal 
freedoms by expanding equal opportunities to all individuals. These distinctions in preferences 
towards and self-identification aligning with political ideology suggest differing attitudes 
towards gender issues (Cunningham, Miner & Benavides-Espinoza, 2012). Research has found 
that people who self-label as conservative are less inclined to act in opposition to sexual 
harassment, while those self-identifying as liberal have greater objection to misogyny 
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(Cunningham et al., 2012). As feminist identification has been directly correlated to higher 
endorsement of liberal beliefs, this convergence of values provided grounds for investigating 
how the five moral concerns map onto feminism (Fitzpatrick Bettencourt, Vacha-Haase, & 
Byrne, 2011; Nelson et al., 2008). 
The present study sought to examine a possible correlation between men’s moral 
concerns according to the MFT and their endorsement of feminism (i.e., feminist beliefs, 
identification, and collective action). We expected these moral concerns to correlate with 
feminism above and beyond their relationship to political ideology. In the present study, the 
moral concerns associated with liberalism (i.e., fairness and harm) were expected to positively 
correlate with men’s support of feminism. Demonstrating greater concern for the fair and 
equitable outcome of gender equality, as well as showing compassion and empathy for women as 
an oppressed social group, would illustrate higher support for feminism. Therefore, a male 
feminist should also be perceived as endorsing those same moral concerns (i.e., harm and 
fairness). In contrast, the moral concerns associated with conservatism (i.e., ingroup, authority, 
and purity) were expected to negatively correlate with men’s support of feminism. Supporting 
men before women (i.e., endorsement of loyalty to the male ingroup), seeking to maintain the 
status quo of the patriarchy (i.e., endorsement of authority), and viewing all women as innately 
pure (i.e., endorsement of purity) contradicts the common beliefs and objectives of the liberal 
feminist movement, and therefore should be associated with lower support for feminism (e.g., 
being a sexist). We predicted that loyalty to one’s ingroup would be most relevant to greater 
feminist endorsement because of the ingroup-outgroup dichotomy initiated by endorsing and 
acting on behalf of group membership. In other words, if a man advocates for feminists, a social 
identity that is primarily associated with women, this act could be perceived as an immoral 
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betrayal to other men (Brambilla & Leach 2014; van Zomeren et al., 2010). We also expected 
that authority would correlate with sexist beliefs (i.e., hostile and benevolent sexism), which 
demand that women are ranked below men in the social hierarchy (Glick & Whitehead, 2010). 
Finally, we predicted that purity would correlate with benevolent sexism, as it paints innocence 
as a preferred and naturalized characteristic for women while simultaneously implying that 
defiance of that standard is deplorable (Glick & Whitehead, 2010).  
Previous research on feminism has primarily focused on women’s experiences rather than 
those of men. Furthermore, no research has explored the relationship between feminism and 
moral concerns. In order to rectify that void in the literature, we utilized a survey methodology to 
measure men’s endorsement of the five moral concerns and their endorsement of feminist and 
sexist beliefs, feminist identity, and feminist collective action. Political ideology was also 
assessed, using a separate item of political orientation, for use as a covariate in the analyses. 
Additionally, perceptions of a male feminist were assessed. We hypothesized that male 
participants with high endorsement of the binding traits (i.e., ingroup, authority, and purity, those 
moral concerns related to conservatism) would show low support for feminism. In contrast, the 
male participants with high endorsement of the individualizing traits (i.e., harm and fairness, 
those moral concerns related to liberalism) were predicted to show greater support for feminism. 
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
One hundred twenty-four male participants (M = 35.62 yrs, SD = 12.98 yrs) were 
recruited using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, an online resource that compensates participants for 
each online task (such as a survey) they complete. Previous research has demonstrated that 
Mechanical Turk samples are more diverse and representative of the U.S. population than typical 
DUDE LOOKS LIKE A FEMINIST!  9 
samples gathered online or in college research settings (e.g., Buhrmester, Kwang & Gosling, 
2011). The survey for the present research, created on Qualtrics, was listed as a questionnaire 
about “gender and social issues,” in order to prevent evasion to the term “feminism.” Informed 
consent and IRB approval was obtained prior to start of survey. Of the participants, 97 (78.23%) 
were White/Caucasian, 7 (5.65%) were Black/African American, 1 (.01%) were 
Indigenous/Native American, 8 (6.45%) were Asian/Asian American, 4 (3.23%) were 
Latino/Hispanic/Spanish, 6 (4.84%) were Multiracial, and 1 (.01%) did not report a race.  
Measures 
Morality measures. We administered the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ; 
Graham et al., 2011) to assess the extent to which participants endorsed the five moral concerns: 
harm (α = .68), fairness (α = .66), ingroup (α = .80), authority (α = .78), and purity (α = .89). The 
first half of the measure, moral judgments, investigated participants’ responses to moral 
assessments of specific situations throughout 15 items (three per subscale). For example, “It can 
never be right to kill a human being” (from the harm subscale), “Justice is the most important 
requirement for a society” (from the fairness subscale), “It is more important to be a team player 
than to express oneself” (from the ingroup subscale), “Respect for authority is something all 
children need to learn” (from the authority subscale), and “Chastity is an important and valuable 
virtue” (from the purity subscale). Response options were on a 6ptpt Likert scale ranging from 
Strongly Disagree (1) to Strongly Agree (6). The second half of the MFQ, moral relevance, 
investigated participants’ abstract application of the five moral concerns when making moral 
judgments. The prompt read: “When you decide whether something is right or wrong, to what 
extent are the following considerations relevant to your thinking?” Each of the 15 items, again 
with three per subscale, was answered on the same 6pt Likert scale as in the moral judgments 
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section. For example, “Whether or not someone was cruel” (i.e., harm), “Whether or not some 
people were treated differently from others” (i.e., fairness), “Whether or not someone did 
something to betray his or her group” (i.e., ingroup), “Whether or not someone conformed to the 
traditions of society” (i.e., authority), and “Whether or not someone did something disgusting” 
(i.e., purity). The moral judgments and moral relevance aspects of each moral concern were 
combined into one subscale for each concern, because they showed similar patterns of results in 
the analyses. 
Feminism measures. A single-item measure of feminist identification was used (Ramsey 
et al., 2007). Participants chose which of three statements they believed best described them. The 
options included: “a) I am not a feminist. b) I am not a feminist, but I am in support of feminist 
goals. c) I am a feminist.”  
To assess feminist beliefs, participants also completed the conservative/anti-feminist and 
liberal subscales of the Feminist Perspective Scale (Henley et al., 1998). Two sample items read: 
“The breakdown of the traditional family structure is responsible for the evils in our society” 
(i.e., anti-feminist beliefs; α = .89) and “People should define their marriage and family roles in 
ways that make them feel most comfortable” (i.e., liberal feminist beliefs; α = .78). Each 10-item 
subscale used a 7pt Likert scale, ranging from Strongly Disagree (1) to Strongly Agree (7).  
In order to further evaluate anti-feminist (i.e., sexist) beliefs, the participants took the 
short form of the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (Glick & Whitehead, 2010). Six of the items 
assessed each type of sexism (i.e., hostile and benevolent) on a 6pt Likert scale that ranged from 
Strongly Disagree (1) to Strongly Agree (6). One sample item from the hostile sexism subscale 
is: “Women exaggerate problems they have at work” (α = .88). A sample item from the 
benevolent sexism subscale is: “Men are incomplete without women” (α = .87).  
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To gauge perceptions of a male feminist, we utilized a brief reading portion extracted 
from Rudman, Mescher, and Moss-Racusin’s (2012) study. Participants read an interview of two 
men, representing benevolent sexism and gender egalitarianism (i.e., feminism), who discussed 
the women’s rights movement and feminist identification. Participants responded to 5 items 
created for the present study that assessed their perceptions of the male feminist according to the 
five moral concerns. For each item Mark (i.e., the sexist) and John (i.e., the feminist) were 
labeled at opposite ends of the 6pt Likert scale. The following anchor labels were created for the 
scale: “I would definitely put Mark’s name in the blank” (1), “I would likely put Mark’s name in 
the blank” (2), “I might put Mark’s name in the blank” (3), “I might put John’s name in the 
blank” (4), “I would likely put John’s name in the blank” (5), “I would definitely put John’s 
name in the blank” (6). One sample item read: “The more loyal person is ____.” 
Collective action measure. A collective action measure (van Zomeren et al., 2010) 
assessed the participants’ willingness to engage in feminist behaviors. There were four modified 
items with a scale ranging from Strongly Disagree (1) to Strongly Agree (5). For example, one 
item read: “I would participate in a demonstration against gender issues” (α = .95). After that 
section was a link to the HeForShe campaign page, a movement dedicated to increasing male 
participation in gender equality. Regardless of their choice to follow the link, participants were 
asked in a follow-up item about their lack of interest or decision to participate in the HeForShe 
campaign. 
Political ideology measure. A single-item political ideology measure was utilized to 
assess identification on a continuum of political liberalism and conservatism. Participants chose 
which of the following political orientations they believed best described them. The options 
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included: Liberal (1), Somewhat Liberal (2), Neither Liberal nor Conservative (3), Somewhat 
Conservative (4), and Conservative (5). 
Results 
 
This study aimed to explore whether moral concerns relate to feminist beliefs, feminist 
identity, feminist collective action, and perceptions of a male feminist among men. We predicted 
that high support for the binding traits (i.e., ingroup, authority, and purity, those moral concerns 
related to conservatism) would correlate to less feminist beliefs, feminist identification, and 
support for feminist collective action. We also predicted that high support for the individualizing 
traits (i.e., harm and fairness, those moral concerns related to liberalism) would correlate to more 
feminist beliefs, feminist identification, and support for feminist collective action. Finally, we 
predicted that a male feminist would be perceived as being more concerned with the 
individualizing traits than the binding traits. See Table 1 for descriptive statistics and correlations 
among the variables.  
Political Ideology as a Covariate 
The correlations revealed that political ideology was related to the moral concerns, as has 
been found in previous research (Graham et al., 2009). Participants with greater endorsement of 
conservative ideology had higher scores for ingroup, authority, and purity. Participants with 
greater endorsement of liberal ideology had higher scores for fairness. Political ideology did not 
significantly correlate to harm. Therefore, we found that political ideology generally correlates to 
moral concerns, confirming our prediction.  
Also, as expected, participants with greater endorsement of liberal ideology had higher 
scores for liberal feminist beliefs and feminist collective action. Participants with greater 
endorsement of conservative ideology had higher scores for anti-feminist beliefs, hostile sexism, 
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and benevolent sexism (see Table 1). Feminist identity also related to political ideology, 
F(2,121) = 30.14, p<.001, partial η2 = .33. Participants who identified as feminists most strongly 
endorsed liberal ideology (M = 1.38, SD = .62), supporters also endorsed liberal ideology (M = 
2.28, SD = 1.11), and participants who identified as non-feminists most strongly endorsed 
conservative ideology (M = 3.47, SD = 1.16; all pairwise comparisons were significantly 
different, ps <.02). Therefore, we found that political ideology correlates to feminist beliefs, 
feminist identity, and feminist collective action. As political ideology was related to both the 
moral concerns and feminism, it was used as a covariate in the regression and ANOVA analyses 
described below. 
Feminist Beliefs 
In order to test whether the five moral concerns relate to men’s endorsement of feminist 
and sexist beliefs, we examined correlation and regression analyses. As shown in Table 1 and as 
predicted, ingroup, authority, and purity all positively correlated to anti-feminist beliefs and 
negatively correlated to liberal feminist beliefs. In conjunction, the binding traits positively 
correlated to both hostile sexism and benevolent sexism. Also as predicted, harm and fairness 
positively correlated to liberal feminist beliefs and negatively correlated to anti-feminist beliefs. 
Further, the individualizing traits negatively correlated to both hostile sexism and benevolent 
sexism, with the exception of harm positively correlating to benevolent sexism at a rate below 
statistical significance.  
As political ideology correlated to both the moral concerns and feminist endorsement, we 
tested to see if it was a confounding variable in the relationship between the moral concerns and 
feminist beliefs. Therefore, we ran a series of multiple regression analyses with the morality 
variables predicting the feminist belief variables, controlling for political ideology (see Table 2). 
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Each regression model was statistically significant (ps <.001), explaining 32 to 62% of the 
variance in feminist beliefs. For liberal feminist beliefs, fairness was a significant positive 
predictor, while purity was a significant negative predictor; harm was a marginally significant 
positive predictor, while ingroup and authority were not significant. For anti-feminist beliefs, 
purity and ingroup were significant positive predictors; harm was a marginally significant 
negative predictor, while fairness and authority were not significant predictors. For benevolent 
sexism, ingroup and authority were significant positive predictors; purity was a marginally 
significant positive predictor, while harm and fairness were not significant. For hostile sexism, 
purity was a significant positive predictor; harm was a marginally significant negative predictor, 
while fairness, ingroup, and authority were not significant. These relationships generally support 
our hypotheses, by showing that support for the MFT’s binding and individualizing traits predict 
endorsement of anti-feminist, liberal feminist, hostile sexist, and benevolent sexist beliefs.  
Feminist Identity 
 In order to assess the relationship between the moral concerns and feminist identity, we 
ran a mixed ANOVA with one within-subjects factor (i.e., the five moral concerns) and one 
between-subjects factor (i.e., the three feminist identity groups: non-feminists, supporters, and 
feminists), controlling for political ideology. It was predicted that there would be greater support 
for the binding traits (i.e., ingroup, authority, and purity) amongst participants who identified as 
non-feminists. In contrast, it was predicted that there would be greater support for the 
individualizing traits (i.e., harm and fairness) amongst participants who identified as feminists. 
The analysis revealed a main effect of the moral concerns, F(4,113) = 23.23, p<.001, partial η2 = 
.45, no main effect of feminist identification, F(2,116) = .60, p=.55, partial η2 = .01, and a 
significant interaction, F(8,228) = 2.40, p=.02, partial η2 = .08. Means and standard errors are 
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presented in Table 3 and Figure 1; these are the estimated marginal means at the mean level of 
political ideology, which is 2.71.  
Pairwise comparisons were used to compare endorsement of each of the five moral 
concerns among feminists (n = 16), supporters (n = 49), and non-feminists (n = 55). For ingroup, 
there were no significant differences between the groups (ps >.24). For authority, feminists had 
significantly lower scores than supporters (p = .02) and non-feminists (p = .002); the scores for 
supporters and non-feminists were not significantly different from each other (p = .10). For 
purity, the scores for feminists were marginally lower than those of the non-feminists (p = .08); 
there were no other significant differences (ps > .13). For harm, there were no significant 
differences between any of the groups (ps >.29). For fairness, feminists had significantly higher 
scores than non-feminists (p = .01) and marginally significantly higher than supporters (p = .08); 
there was no difference between the scores of the supporters and non-feminists (p = .16). Thus, 
these findings show partial support for both of our hypotheses.   
Feminist Collective Action 
 In addition to testing feminist beliefs and identification, we also tested whether moral 
concerns related to feminist collective action. We examined both correlation and regression 
analyses relating the five moral concerns to the collective action scale. As shown in Table 1, 
harm and fairness positively correlated to intentions to participate in feminist collective action, 
while authority and purity were negatively correlated. Ingroup was not significantly correlated to 
feminist collective action. As shown in Table 2, the regression analysis controlling for political 
ideology indicated that loyalty to one’s ingroup was a positive predictor of feminist collective 
action, while authority was a negative predictor. Harm was a marginally significant predictor, 
while fairness and purity were not significant predictors of feminist collective action. 
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In order to assess a feminist behavior in the moment, we used independent sample t-tests 
to examine whether participants who expressed interest in or ultimately joined HeForShe’s 
movement for gender equality (n = 50) had greater endorsement of the individualizing traits and 
lower endorsement of the binding traits. None of the independent samples t-tests found support 
for this prediction, as none of the p-values reached significance (all ts < 1.62, all ps > .11). When 
controlling for political ideology in a series of ANOVAs, we also found no difference between 
participants who expressed interest in the HeForShe campaign and those who did not (n = 74), in 
regards to the five moral concerns.  
Perceptions of a Feminist 
In order to determine whether the moral concerns were incorporated into the perceptions 
of a male feminist, we used a repeated measures ANOVA to test whether the male feminist was 
rated as more fair, compassionate, loyal, having a high regard for authority or high concern for 
purity. Means and standard errors for each rating are illustrated in Figure 2. There was a 
significant effect of the moral perceptions, F(4,118) = 31.29, p <.001, partial η2 = .52. The 
participants rated the male feminist as being equally concerned with compassion and fairness (p 
= .44), and significantly more concerned with compassion and fairness than with loyalty, 
authority, and purity (ps <.001). Specifically, loyalty and authority were viewed as being equally 
endorsed by the male feminist (p = .23), while purity was endorsed the least (ps < .001). In other 
words, the participants perceived the male feminist as possessing the same moral concerns that 
we hypothesized would be related to feminism. 
 Additionally, in order to more specifically compare the participants’ moral perceptions of 
a male feminist to a benevolent sexist, we ran a series of one-sample t-tests with 3.5 as the test 
value, which represents an equivalent perception of the sexist and the feminist. The male 
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feminist was perceived as being significantly more compassionate (t(122) = 5.76, p < .001, d = 
1.05) and fair (t(122) = 5.22, p < .001, d = .94), compared to the sexist. The male feminist was 
perceived as being equally loyal (t(123) = .85, p = .40, d = .15) and concerned with authority 
(t(123) = -.64, p = .52, d = .12) as the sexist. The sexist was perceived as being significantly 
more concerned with purity (t(123) = -7.76, p < .001, d = 1.40) than the male feminist. 
Discussion   
This study investigated the relationship between the five moral concerns of the MFT and 
feminist endorsement among men. While not every moral concern reached significance in every 
analysis, the results generally supported our hypotheses that men with high support for the 
binding traits (i.e., ingroup, authority, and purity) endorse anti-feminist beliefs, are less likely to 
identify as feminists, and are less interested in feminist collective action. Men with high support 
for the individualizing traits (i.e., harm and fairness) endorse feminist beliefs, are more likely to 
identify as feminists, and are more interested in feminist collective action. Further, the moral 
concerns and feminism seem to demonstrate a relationship in their own right, separate from the 
influence of political ideology. 
Feminist Beliefs  
Although the overall findings generally fit the predicted pattern of results (e.g., feminism 
and the individualizing traits versus anti-feminism and the binding traits), not every variable 
mapped exactly onto that dichotomy. In the regression analyses harm was not a significant 
predictor of any belief variables (though it was marginally significant in the predicted direction 
for several) and fairness was only a significant positive predictor of liberal feminist beliefs, when 
controlling for political ideology. These findings suggest that fairness is a stronger predictor of 
feminist beliefs among men than harm. Possibly, harm did not have as strong a relationship as 
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hypothesized because society’s norms and the feminist movement are equally concerned with the 
well-being of others. This moral concern may not translate into support for feminism among men 
if they do not perceive current gender norms as being harmful. As both harm and fairness had 
very high overall means and smaller standard deviations than the other moral concerns, it is 
possible that the concerns pertaining to the individualizing traits are more universal, which may 
have limited the variables’ predictive abilities. Additionally, several of the associations between 
the binding traits demonstrated predictive relationships with the belief variables when controlling 
for political ideology. Therefore, men’s moral concerns about loyalty to an ingroup, authority, 
and purity may relate strongly to their feminist beliefs moreso than the individualizing traits of 
harm and fairness. 
 Looking more closely at the relationships between the binding traits and the feminist 
belief variables, it is noteworthy that both loyalty to one’s ingroup and respect for authority were 
stronger predictors of benevolent sexism than hostile sexism. These predictive relationships were 
unexpected because we had not anticipated a difference in the endorsement of sexist beliefs. 
Loyalty to one’s ingroup and respect for authority may have predicted benevolent sexism 
because benevolent sexism emphasizes the raising of one sex, a social ingroup, above another in 
a hierarchy. On the other hand, purity defied our expectations and predicted hostile sexism 
instead of benevolent sexism, as well as emerged as the strongest predictor of men’s feminist 
beliefs. Purity remained at minimum a marginally significant predictor of all of the belief 
variables in the regression analyses. Notably, a few of the items measuring liberal feminist and 
anti-feminist beliefs directly mentioned homosexuality, and previous research has shown that 
homosexuality can elicit disgust reactions (i.e., the response to purity violations; Balzer & Jacobs 
2011; Inbar, Pizarro, Knobe, & Bloom 2009). However, purity was also related to the sexist 
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beliefs and because neither the hostile nor benevolent sexism items mentioned homosexuality its 
connection to disgust cannot completely explain the predictive power of purity. Future research 
should investigate the relationship between purity and feminism, including whether purity 
violations might affect feminist endorsement, and why purity is more relevant than loyalty to 
one’s ingroup and respect for authority in men’s endorsement of feminist beliefs.  
Feminist Identity  
In the relationship between the five moral concerns and feminist identification, our 
results showed that the binding traits (i.e., authority and purity, but not ingroup) were more 
strongly endorsed by participants who self-identified as non-feminists, and that one 
individualizing trait (i.e., fairness, but not harm) was more strongly endorsed by participants who 
self-identified as feminists. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that these results demonstrated a 
pattern similar to one found by Graham and colleagues (2009). Their findings suggested that 
people who identify with conservative beliefs weigh the five moral concerns more evenly, 
whereas people who identify with liberal beliefs favor the individualizing traits over the binding 
traits. Our results showed that non-feminists weighed the five moral concerns more evenly, while 
the feminists favored the individualizing traits over the binding traits. We also found a pattern of 
fewer differences across the feminist identity levels for harm and fairness and greater differences 
for ingroup, authority, and purity. Thus, it is possible that justice is important to most people, 
while authority and purity are of greater concern to non-feminists versus feminists.  
Non-feminists viewing sexism as harmless and inconsequential could explain the lack of 
statistical difference across the identity levels for harm. Despite considering harm (i.e., the 
concern for the well-being of others) a part of their sense of morality, it currently does not 
motivate them to support feminism. Bridging this gap by tapping into the potential universality 
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of harm could help increase feminist endorsement. This approach could be effective to subvert 
the initial stigma linked to feminists and feminism’s association with the female gender. By 
instead focusing on harm as a broader and more relatable construct and then tying it to fairness, 
feminists could gradually provide non-feminists with the insight necessary to comprehend the 
values behind the movement in a consumable and non-threatening manner.   
Feminist Collective Action  
Surprisingly, the individualizing traits were not significant predictors of intention towards 
feminist collective action, suggesting that their relationship may be contingent upon their 
association with liberal political ideology. Further, ingroup was a positive predictor of feminist 
collective action, authority was a negative predictor, and purity was not a significant predictor. 
These findings defied the expected pattern that the binding traits would all negatively predict 
feminist collective actions among men. As the ingroup variable speaks to loyalty in general, 
versus specifying a particular group, perhaps male feminists who are morally motivated by 
loyalty drove up the positive association between ingroup and feminist collective action. It is 
easier to understand why authority negatively correlated to and predicted a decrease in feminist 
collective action, aligning with our prediction. An innovative and unifying movement, such as 
one for gender equality, seeks to uproot an existing social hierarchy, which places feminism in 
direct opposition to respect for authority. Therefore, if someone endorses maintenance of 
authority figures and social order, it would be hypocritical for that person to also want to work 
towards demolishing the status quo. 
Although all of the moral concerns demonstrated some relationship with collective 
action, whether correlational, predictive, or both, there was no connection to feminist behavior in 
the moment. Regardless of their level of interest in the HeForShe campaign, there was no 
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difference in moral concern endorsement amongst the participants. It is possible that no 
differences emerged because of external factors, such as participants having concerns about the 
link featured in the survey producing viruses on their computers, about whether visiting another 
website would disrupt their participation in the survey, or not wanting to take time away from the 
task at hand. Instead, the participants may not have questioned the mechanism or validity of the 
link itself, but rather the future investment required by visiting HeForShe’s website or pledging 
to join their social movement. They may have anticipated a required donation or an unwanted 
email subscription. These elements offer plausible explanations that diffuse participation 
differences regardless of the feminist behavior or lack-thereof in the moment.  
Perceptions of a Feminist  
To further investigate how moral concerns relate to men’s support for feminism, 
participants read a short vignette featuring a male feminist and male benevolent sexist, before 
indicating which person was more concerned with each of the five moral concerns. The 
participants perceived the male feminist as being more concerned with harm and fairness, and 
the benevolent sexist as being more concerned with purity. They also perceived the male 
feminist as being moderately concerned with ingroup and authority, in relatively equal measure. 
All of these findings demonstrate some level of comprehension of the feminist perspective; 
therefore this direct understanding could offer another important explanation for why people 
elect not to endorse feminism. If some men recognize that feminists do not support ingroup, 
authority, and purity concerns, then those men may have difficulty supporting the movement. On 
the other hand, men who emphasize harm and fairness concerns over ingroup, authority, and 
purity concerns may realize their values are in alignment with feminism and decide to support 
the movement.  
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Future Research 
This study discovered a relationship between the MFT’s five moral concerns and 
feminism among a sample of men in the United States. It provides an excellent foundation for 
further research, such as assessing specific subcultures or other countries to either replicate these 
results or find divergences. It could also be informative to assess the relationship between the 
five moral concerns and feminism among women, in order to draw gender comparisons. After 
all, participants’ personal histories and experiences of sexism could have a significant impact on 
their definition of and response to feminism. For men specifically, there may also be other 
reasons besides moral concerns that encourage or dissuade their involvement in the feminist 
movement (e.g., raising a daughter). Additionally, research could also investigate the role of 
moral concerns in other social movements (e.g., Black Lives Matter).  
Investigating purity and its role in the relationship between morality and feminist 
endorsement would be particularly enlightening. For example, researchers could experimentally 
study implicit disgust reactions to feminism as a purity violation, given that Balzer and Jacobs 
(2011) found an association between disgust sensitivity, social attitudes, and political ideology. 
Additionally, feminist behavior could be studied more extensively than the brief HeForShe 
behavior examined in the present study, in order to establish whether moral concerns actually 
motivate feminist behavior or only feminist beliefs.  
Finally, this study utilized a correlational design, thus limiting the degree to which we 
can determine causation between moral concern endorsement and men’s support for feminism. 
Experimental research could investigate whether morality motivates men’s interest (or 
disinterest) in feminism. For example, real-world feminist appeals to morality (e.g., social media 
campaigns, blogs, or memes) could be incorporated to explore a direct causal relationship 
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between exposure to morality messages and higher feminist endorsement. There are many other 
possibilities for future experimental research, such as assessing whether feminism shapes men’s 
morality by emphasizing or deemphasizing certain types of feminism to increase its appeal to 
men who endorse varying moral concerns. Additionally, a third, unknown factor may be 
affecting the endorsement of both the moral concerns and feminism. Further, cultural values 
(e.g., family loyalty) could have an impact on the relationship between moral concerns and 
feminist endorsement among men. Studying a more racially and culturally diverse sample of men 
would increase the representative and complex nature of these findings.  
Conclusion 
 Now, more than ever, feminism has been brought back to the forefront of society due to 
increased media attention (Vincent, 2014). This study sheds light potential reasoning behind the 
low rate of male feminist endorsement. By considering the role of moral concerns in feminism, 
there could be a deeper understanding of obstacles that prevent male feminist endorsement and 
further efforts seeking to overcome them in order to allow the movement to gain further 
momentum. It is essential that men also know that they can endorse feminist beliefs, self-identify 
as feminists, and act on behalf of feminism. When men fully acknowledge gender inequality, 
society can finally experience a shift that allows people, regardless of sex, to work together as 
equals (Pleasants, 2011). A moral drive to “do the right thing” could be crucial to facilitate these 
changes and boost support for the feminist movement. 
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Table 1. Descriptives and Correlations 












Harm 25.94 4.84 -           
Fairness 26.84 4.45 .59*** -          
Ingroup 21.30 5.88  .14   -.06 -         
Authority 22.89 5.62  .21*   -.04 .73*** -        
Purity 19.21 7.82  .05   -.19* .59*** .64*** -       
Liberal 
Feminism 





-.12   -.26** .60***    .57*** .75*** -.49*** -          
Benevolent 
Sexism 
20.89 7.05  .05   -.06 .55*** .56*** .50***    -.17† .55*** -      
Hostile 
Sexism 
18.16 6.78 -.14   -.20* .48***    .46*** .50***    -.34*** .71***      .42*** -        
Collective 
Action 
10.42 4.64  .23*    .22* -.09   -.21* -.18*     .41***    -.26**     -.05 -.33*** -  
Political 
Ideology 
2.72 1.32 -.12   -.23*  .45***    .44***  .49***    -.54***     .53***      .22*  .40***    -.42*** - 
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Table 2. Multiple Regression Analyses 
Dependent Variables: Liberal Feminism Anti-Feminism Benevolent Sexism Hostile Sexism Collective Action 
 
 t  t  t  t  t 
Predictor Variables: 
          
Harm  .15  1.86†  -.14  -1.95† -.10 -1.02 -.20 -1.96†   .20   1.91† 
Fairness  .30  3.63***   .02     .30  .07    .76  .03   .32   .02     .19 
Ingroup  .00    .02   .22   2.58*  .24  2.18*  .18 1.56   .26   2.09* 
Authority  .08    .75   .06     .06  .38 
  
 3.13**  .19 1.42  -.35  -2.47* 
Purity -.34 -3.70***   .54 6.52***  .20  1.92†  .26   2.35*   .06     .53 
Political Ideology -.33 -4.19***   .12   1.50 -.16 -1.79  .08   .82  -.39 -3.93*** 
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Table 3. Moral Concern Endorsement 
Moral Concerns:  Harm Fairness Ingroup Authority Purity 
 n M SE M SE M SE M SE M SE 
Feminist Identification:            
Feminists 16 27.17 1.33 29.50 1.16 19.45 1.41 18.73 1.34 15.92 1.85 
Supporters 49 26.34   .71 27.27   .62 20.96   .76 22.18   .72 19.01   .99 
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Figure 1. Mean rating of endorsement for each moral concern for participants identifying as feminists, supporters, and non-feminists, 
when controlling for political ideology (M = 2.71). Error bars represent standard errors. There was a main effect of the moral 
concerns, F(4,113) = 23.23, p<.001, partial η2 = .45, no main effect of identification, F(2,116) = .60, p=.55, partial η2 = .01, and a 
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Figure 2. Mean rating of participants’ perception of the male feminist’s endorsement of each moral concern, F(4,118) = 31.29, p 










Harm Fairness Ingroup Authority Purity
Perceptions of a Male Feminist
